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COMES NOW, the Appellant, City of Boise City, by aid through its attorneys of record, 
and hereby files its initial brief in the above-captioned matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves the con~plicated relationship between cities, counties and the district 
courts in Idaho and specifically presents for resolution the question whether the district court 
can, under the current statutory scheme, order the City of Boise to provide facilities, personnel 
and equipment for a Magistrate's Division of the District Court when Ada County is already 
providi~~g those same facilities, personnel and equipment at taxpayer's expense. 
11. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On September 14, 2007, the City of Boise filed a Petition to set aside an Administrative 
Order dated October 9, 1980, which required the City of Boise to provide facilities and 
equipment for a Magistrate's Division of the Fourth Judicial District Court. (R., pp. 6 - 11) Ada 
County moved to intervene and objected to setting aside the 1980 Administrative Order. (R., pp. 
17 - 28) Over Boise City's objection to the intervention by Ada County (R., pp. 31 - 38), the 
District Judges allowed Ada County to Intervene and oppose Boise City's Petition to Set Aside 
the 1980 Administrative Order. (R., pp. 44 - 50) Afrer oral argument before the Fourth Judicial 
i ,  
District Judges en bane, the District Court denied Boise City's Pdti'tion to Set Aside the 1980 
Administrative Order in a Memorandum Decision filed on May 16, 2008. (R., pp. 60 - 76) The 
City of Boise filed its Notice of Appeal on June 19,2008. 
111. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A historical perspective is necessary to fully appreciate the position in which the City of 
Boise found itself in 2007. The relevant history begins with the Idaho court reform legislation 
which was enacted in 1969 and became effective in 1971. (R., pp. 60 - 62) Of particular 
significance to this case are Idaho Code $5 1-2217 and 2218 which were part of the court reform 
legislation. Idaho Code $ 1-2217 requires counties to provide quarters, facilities, equipmei~t, 
staff, supplies and other expe~~ses for the magistrate's division of the district court. Cities, 
however, are oilly required "upon order of a majority of the district judges in the judicial district" 
to provide quarters, facilities, equipment, staff, supplies and other expenses for the magistrate's 
division ofthe district court. 
a. The City of Boise Initially Provided Magistrate Services in 1971 when the 
Court Reform Legislation became Effective. 
On January 11, 1971, the effective date of the court reform Iegislation, the district judges 
of the Fourth Judicial District entered ail order requiring the City of Boise to "provide suitable 
and adequate quarters for two magistrates of the Fourth District Court Magistrates Division, 
including two courtrooms with related facilities . . . ." (R., p. 10) Boise City complied with the 
Order by continuing to provide facilities to handle Boise City's misdemeanors and traffic court 
in an old fire station on Koote~lai Street in Boise. (R., p. 63; R. Eji. 19, Second Navano Aff., 
. t 
para. 7) 
b. Nine Years Later, Boise City constructed the Barrister facility to house a 
"Magistrate's Division of the District Court." 
On October 9, 1980, the district judges of the Fourth Judicial District entered a new order 
requiring the City of Boise to provide quarters, facilities, equipment, staff, supplies and other 
with the Order and built a court facility with five courtrooms, cornmoi~ly called Banister, and 
provided other facilities, equipment, staff, supplies and expenses to operate it. 
To help fund the Barrister facility, Boise City received the Idaho Code f) 31-3201A(b) 
and (c) $5.00 city general fund c o w  fee allocation and the $2.50 city capital facilities court Tee 
allocation. (R., p. 64; R. Ex. 19, Second Navarro Aff., para. 21-22) 
c. By 1983 the District Court Moved All Misdemeanors, etc., to Barrister. 
Initially the Barrister facility handled only Boise City cases, but that soon changed. In 
1983, Ada County Administrative Judge Warren H. Gilmore directed that all misdemeanors, 
animal control, parking, open container, tobacco, drinking violations, infractions, Fish and Game 
violations, Outfitter and Guide violations, water and watercraft violations, bicycle and pedestrian 
violations and littering cases would be conducted at Barrister. @., p. 88, Ex. 29, Ailen Aff., Ex. 
F.) All other misdemeanors not listed were to be filed in ihe magistrate's division at the county 
courthouse. Walk-in arraignments for Boise City, Ada County, Meridian and Garden City were 
to be conducted at Barrister. Id. 
d. Ada County Provided Staff in 1989 Due to the Growing Magistrate Court 
System. 
In 1989, the Trial Court Administrator approached the Ada County Clerk and requested 
that Ada County employ a manager supervisor at the Barrister c o q .  (R. p. 88, Ex. 19, Second 
E 
Navarro Aff., para. 13.) Ada County eventually contributed clerks and a supervisor at Barrister 
due to "the growing magistrate court system". (R., p. 64; R. Ex. 19, Second Navarro Aff., para. 
13; R. Ex. 29, Allen Aff, Ex. I) 
e. Discussion of Merger of Barrister Employees Began Around 1991. 
JJI the late '80s the concept of a consolidated courthouse was mulled over. In 1990 the 
Ada County Commissioner's purchased 14.5 acres of property at Third and Front Streets for 
building a new courthouse. (R., pp. 65 - 66; R. Ex. 11, Simmons Aff.) This was the first official 
step in laying a foundation for a consolidated courthouse in Ada Cou~ty.  The next step was 
consolidation of court enlployies. In a letter by the Ada County Trial Court Administrator 
(TCA),' John Traylor, relates he met on September 10, 1991, with Ada County representatives 
Ted Argyle, Terry .Tohnsonz and Dave Navarro to discuss the County taking over Boise City's 
employees at traffic court. (R., p. 88, Ex. 29, Allen Aff., Ex. K, p. I.) In the letter, which was 
titled "Traffic Court Personnel Merger," the TCA recounts the 1991 meeting explaining that all 
of the Ada County meeting participants agreed the merger needed to take place. The TCA 
instructed the City to make the next move so the merger was ready for the upcoming fiscal year. 
He also suggested revisions to a 1989 draft proposal transferring the City's Barrister employees 
over to the County. Id. 
f. Discussions in 1992 with Other Cities in Ada County Proved Fruitless. 
111 1992, the TCA, began discussions with Garden City and Meridian to obtain their 
contribution to the cost of providing the Barrister facility. The TCA fully understood that the 
facility should not be funded solely by Boise residents. One month & to the merger letter 
! 
written to Boise City, the TCA wrote letters to the mayors of ~ & b i a n  and Garden City in an 
attempt to get thein to provide funding for Barrister employees. (R. p. 88, R. Ex. 29, Allen Aff, 
' The TCA is a position first created by the Idaho Supreme Court in the 1970s with a federal 
grant. MERLIN S. YOUNG ET AL., JUSTICE FOR THE TIMES: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE IDAHO 
STATE COURTS, 188 (Carl F. Bianchi, ed., Idaho Law Foundation, 1990). 
Director of Ada County Human Resources. 
Ex. 1 and J.) The TCA explained to the mayors that Barrister was used by every law 
enforcemei~t entity in Ada County and Boise City was footing most of the bill: 
[All1 traEfic citations, fonnal misdemeanor complaints and any other 
citation issued by an Idaho law enforcement officer in Ada County are 
processed through the Ada CountyIBoise City Traffic Court . . . . That 
building was built in 1980 by Boise City. . . in compliance with an Order 
of the District Court to provide the building, staff and necessary supplies 
and equipment to operate an adequate court facility. Each year, Boise City 
provides approximately $663,000 for operation of the Traffic Court, 20 
city-paid full-time employees . . . and equipment and supplies. In addition, 
more funds are budgeted for the operation and maintenance of the building 
and grounds. 
Id. p. 1. The TCA and Boise City worlced well together. As he explained to the mayors in 1992, 
Boise City had funded most of his requests: 
Since I assumed my positioil with the court in 1984, with the exception of 
one year, I have asked Boise City for funding additional clerical staff 
every budget year. For the most part, they have been very generous and 
understanding. 
Id. p. 2. The TCA pushed the mayors to pay just enough to staff their portion, not maintenance 
and operating expenses. Neither Garden City nor Meridian agreed to reimburse Ada County for 
Barrister employees. Their respective mayors either "refused to budget sufficient funds or have 
indicated they [did] not have sufficient funds." (K. p. 88, R. Ex. 29, Allen Aff., Ex. L.) 
g. Boise City and Ada County File a Petition to Get Meridian and Garden City 
to Contribute. ! 
.i 
Working on the assumption the District Court could force contribution, the TCA 
confidentially suggested that the City and County file a joint petition for contribution requesting 
an appointment of "a Special Master to gather facts and make recoinmendation to the Court." Id. 
He had already "received authority for payment of a Special Master." Id 
Complying with the TCA's suggestion, Ada County and Boise City jointly filed a petition 
on June 21, 1994, with the TCA asking for contribution from Meridian and Garden City. (R. p. 
88, R. Ex. 29, Allen Aff, Ex. M.) 
On August 12, 1994, the district judges of the Fourtl~ Judicial District entered an order 
requiring Garden City and Meridian to provide quarters, facilities, equipme~tt, staff, supplies and 
other expenses for a "magistrate's division of the District Court." Neither city complied with the 
Order. (R., pp. 64 - 65; R. Ex. 20, Second Reiner Aff., Ex. A; R. Ex. 29, Allen Aff., Ex. L) 
h. A Consolidated Courthouse Concept was Adopted in 1994. 
Also in 1994 a plan had been adopted for a "consolidated" courthouse which would 
house all of the district courts and magistrate courts in Ada County. (R., pp. 65 - 66; R. Ex. 11, 
Simmons Aff. ) In 1996 the voters of Ada County approved the County Cormnissio~~ers' concept 
when they voted to approve an advisory question contained on the primary election ballot: 
If there is NOT an increase in property taxes, do you favor the 
construction of a Consolidated Courthouse and Administration Center 
through a public-private partnership? 
i. In 1999 Boise City and Ada County Enter into an Agreement to Consolidate 
Court Employees and Functions under One Roof. 
Before ground was broken for the new Ada County Couqouse, Boise City and Ada 
'I 
County finally entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on October 1, 1999. (R., pp. 
65 - 66; R. Ex. 19, Ex. C to Second Navarro Aff.; R. Ex. 11, Simmons Aff., R. Ex. 12, Walker 
Aff,, para. 5) This appears to be the consummation of the 1991 "Traffic Court Personnel 
Merger". 
In the MOA, Boise City and Ada County agreed that it was in the best interests of the 
community to consolidate court employees and Functions under one roof. Ada County 
represented that it: 
has elected to provide at its sole cost and expense a single courthouse 
complex for both the District Court and the Magistrate's Division thereof, 
including the functions of the Distcict Court, both civil and criminal, and 
probate court, police court and justice courts as those functions existed 
prior to judicial reorganization . . .; 
(R. Ex. 19, Ex. C to Second Navarro Aff.) 
In that same 1999 MOA, Boise City agreed, subject to review and renegotiation, to 
provide funding to Ada County for municipal court employees who were transferred to Ada 
County as well as provide funding for maintenance and operating costs and equipment. (R. Ex. 
19, Ex. C to Second Navarro Aff.) The MOA was approved by a Resolution of the Boise City 
Council. (R. Ex. 19, Ex. D to Second Navarro Aff.) 
j. Consolidated Courthouse Opens in 2002. 
In 2002, the Ada County Courthouse opened and the Barrister court facility closed. (R., 
pp. 66 - 67) The Ada County Courthouse is a County facility and the City of Boise has no 
ownership in the facility. (R., p. 66) While Boise City was providing the Barrister facility, it 
received the $5.00 and the $2.50 fees authorized by Idaho Code 3 31-3201AP) and (c) for all 
J 
cases filed at the Barrister facility. (R., p. 64; R. Ex. 19, Second Ndvko  Aff., para. 22; R. Ex. 7, 
Faw Aff., para. 3) After the Barrister court functions were consolidated into the new Ada 
County Courthouse, Boise City stopped receiving these fees. (R., p. 67) Ultimately, however, 
Ada County agreed to give Boise City a "credit" equivalent to the $5.00 fee. Boise City still does 
not receive the $2.50 fee because the facility is not a City-owned facility. (R., p. 67; R. Ex. 19, 
Second Navarro Aff., para. 23; R. Ex. 7, Faw Aff., para. 4; R. Ex. 10, Rock Aff., para. 7 & 8) 
k. Attempts to Renegotiate Agreement. 
The 1999 MOA has never been reviewed or renegotiated. (R., Ex. 14, Simmons Aff.) 
Boise City's share of the funding for the Magistrate Court under the 1.999 MOA is approximately 
between $750,000 - $800,000lyear and approximately $200,00Oiyear for trial court administrator 
fees associated with the Magistrate Court. (R., Ex. 1, Navarro Aff. dated 10112i07, para. 5; R., 
Ex. 2, Reiner Aff. dated 10i12107, para. 3; R., Ex. 13, Bower Aff.) Part of this obligation is paid 
by the $5.00 "credit" but the majority of Boise City's payment is paid from property tax 
revenues in its general fund. (R., Ex. 13, Bower Aff., para. 10; R., Ex. 7, Faw Aff., para. 4; R., 
Ex. 8, Houde Aff.) 
After the decision in Twin Falls County v. City of Twin Falls, 143 Idaho 398 (2006), 
Boise City sought unsuccessfully lo review and renegotiate the 1999 MOA with Ada County. 
(R., Ex. 29, Ex. P and Q to Allen Aff.) At approximately the same time the City of Boise filed 
its Petition to set aside an Administrative Order dated October 9, 1980, it stopped making 
payments to Ada County. (R., p. 67) The validity of the 1999 MOA and its enforcement were 
not before the District Court and were not decided by the District Court in its Memorandum 
Decision and Order. (R., p. 48) J, 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Where Ada County provides tbe physical facilities and other amenities for the 
magistrate division, can the district judges in the Fourth Judicial District legally order 
Boise City to continue to also provide facilities and other amenities for the magistrate 
division when no additional or different facilities are needed? 
2. Whether the district judges erred in holding that the continuation of the 1980 Order 
requiring Boise City to provide the county magistrate court facility and functions was 
constitutional. 
3. Whether the district judges of the Fourth Judicial District erred in allowing Ada 
County to intervene. 
4. Whether the district judges of the Fourt11 Judicial District imposed an erroneous 
burden of proof upon the City of Boise. 
5. Whether the district judges of the Fourth Judicial District failed to properly and 
thoroughly evaluate the necessity of the 1980 Order pursuant to law. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATION AND THE FACTUAL NECESSITY FOR THE 
1980 ORDER NO LONGER EXIST WHICH REQUIRES THAT IT BE 
VACATED. 
5 
1. Standard of Review. E 
This issue iilvolves the interpretation of Idaho Code §$ 1-2217, 1-2218 and 31-3201A. 
The decision in Twin Falls County, identified the correct standard of review: 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the 
statute's literal words. Where the language of a statute is plain and urranlbiguous, 
courts give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory 
construction. In other words, where statute is clear, legislative history and other 
extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly 
expressed intent of the Legislature. 
Twin Falls County, 143 Idaho at 399 (citations omitted). 
2. Legal Analysis and Argument. 
The Fourth Judicial District Judges, sitting en banc, decided that since the 1980 Order 
does not require the City of Boise to pay a pro rata share of the cost of operating and maintaining 
the Ada County Courthouse, the Order does not violate this Court's holding in Twin Falls 
County and should not he vacated. This rationale fails to achowledge the undisputed fact that 
today Ada County provides the building which houses the magistrate's division in Ada County. 
The Judges paid lip service to this fact by acknowledging that circumstances had, indeed, 
changed but reasoned that because "Boise City accounts for the greatest percentage and the 
greatest number of misdemeanor and inkaction filings in Ada County" such fact "alone militates 
against setting aside the Court's Order of October 9, 1980." The decision simply does not square 
with the statutory scheme which governs the undisputed facts in this case. 
It is undisputed that since 2002 Ada County has owned the building which currently 
houses the magistrate's division for Ada Under the 1971 Order and under the 1980 
Order Boise City provided the building and the expenses associatelfi with operating magistrate 
courtrooms to handle its cases. Now Ada County provides the building and there is no legal 
justification for continuance of the Order. In Twin Falls County, this Court explained: 
' The only exception is that juvenile proceedings are handled in separate facilities, but this fact 
does not change the analysis or the decision. (R., p. 64, L. 10; p. 65, Ls. 16 - 17; p. 66, L. 20) 
10 
LC. $5; 1-2217 and 2218 do not envision entwined -or shared facilities and 
expenses. The entity which provides the building also provides the expenses 
associated with operating it. Thus, the district judges only had the authority to 
order the Cities to provide courthouse facilities. 
143 Idaho at 400. 
In Twin Falls County, just as it is in Ada County since 2002, there was only one 
courthouse facility which housed both the district court and the magistrate's division of the 
district court. The statutory scheme, and the decision in Twin Falls County, envisions in such a 
situation that there is no legal basis or justification for an Idaho Code 5; 1-2218 Order requiring 
the cities in such a county to provide magistrate facilities. The Order in Twin Falls County went 
beyond the language of Idaho Code 5; 1-2218 and actually ordered the cities to pay a 
proportionate share of the cost of operating the magistrate's division. The Fourth Judicial 
District Judges in this case reasoned that because the 1980 Order did not require Boise City to 
pay a proportionate share of the expenses, the decision in Twin Falls County was not controlling. 
Boise City disagrees. 
The only justification for an Idaho Code 5; 1-2218 Order requiring Boise City to provide 
magistrate facilities would be an actual necessity for such separate facility. The Fourth Judicial 
District Judgcs did not find that separate facilities were feasible or necessary.4 There is, in fact, 
no basis for such a finding. It is undisputed that the Ada County burthouse was built for the 
specific purpose of providing a consolidated courthouse where both the district court and the 
magistrate's division would be housed and, in fact, it has fimctioned since 2002 as a consolidated 
During oral argument before thc Judges of the Fourth Judicial District, silting en banc, counsel 
for Ada County suggested that additional separate facilities possibly made sense, but there was 
no evidence presented on the necessity or feasibility of doing so and there were no findings by 
the Judges on this issue. (Tr., p. 25, L. 3 - p. 26, L. 2) 
courthouse. (R., pp. 11, 65 - 66; R. Ex. 11, Simnons Aff.) Unless the Fourth Judicial District 
Judges intend to require Boise City to provide separate physical facilities for the magistrate's 
division, Idaho Code 5 1-2218 does not provide the legal authority for entry of an Order 
requiring Boise City to provide facilities and expenses for the magistrate's division. 
Idaho Code 5 31-3201A(b) and (c) do not give cities and counties the authority to alter 
the method by which the provider of the facilities is reimbursed from court fees. The current 
reimbursement method employed by the Ada County Clerk in which Boise City is billed for a 
proportion of the expenses for operation, of the magistrate's division and is credited for an 
amount equivalent to the $5.00 reimbursement provided for in Idaho Code 5 31-3201A(b) and 
(c) is patently invalid. The Fourth Judicial District Judges were incorrect when they held that 
there was an "obligation" under the 1980 Order for Boise City to provide facilities or expenses. 
After Ada County opened the new consolidated courthouse in 2002, it receives the $5.00 fee by 
statute and pays the expenses for the magistrate's division. After Ada County began providing 
the facilities, Boise City is not entitled to receive the Idaho Code 5 31-3201A(b) and (c) fees nor 
is it obligatedto pay for the expenses of operating the magistrate's division. Twin Falls County, 
143 Idaho at 401. ,("By ordering the Cities to reimburse the County, the district judges 
impermissibly blurred the line between a facility provided by a co.unty and one provided by a 
; \ 
city.") By holding that there was any continuing "obligation" under the 1980 Order after Ada 
County began providing the facilities impermissibly blurred the line between a facility provided 
by a county and one provided by a city. 
Although the Fourth Judicial District Judges recognized that Boise's Petition did not 
present the opportunity to adjudicate the validity or enforcement of the 1999 MOA, the Judges 
were unable to separate the disputes between Boise City and Ada County over that agreement 
from the questions presented in Boise's Petition. (R., p. 48) The only questions before the 
Fourth Judicial District Judges was whether there was a legal basis or factual necessity to retain 
the 1980 Order which required Boise City to provide the facilities and expenses for a 
magistrate's division. The Fourth Judicial District Judges justified their decision by stating 
"[Bloth the 1999 Agreement and the Boise City Council Resolution approving execution of the 
Agreement acknowledged that Boise City remained obligated by the 1980 Order to continue to 
provide suitable facilities for a magistrate's division of the district court." (R., p. 71) 
There is no justification for linking the continuation of the 1980 Order to the enforcement 
of the 1999 MOA because Twin-Falls County interpreted Idaho Code $5 1-2217 and 2218 as not 
envisioning entwined or shared facilities and expenses. Twin Falls County, 143 Idaho at 400 
Prior to the 2006 decision in Twin Falls County, many understood Idaho Code $5 1-2217 and 
2218 as providing a legal basis for cities to reimburse counties for the operation of magistrate 
courts in the county-provided  courthouse^.^ However, Twin Falls County changed that. 
Whether the 1999 MOA has continuing validity or can be enforced was not before the District 
Judges .of the Fourth Judicial District. It must stand or fall on its own in a separate proceeding. 
The only question presented here is whether Boise City should continue to be ordered to provide 
b 
magistrate facilities when Ada County is providing those facilitiei. 4 The only answer which is 
 h he County argues the district judges were authorized to order reimbursernei~t because I.C. 5 
1-2217 and LC. 5 1-2218 should be read together. Under the County's view, LC. 5 1-2217 
requires that the County provide and pay for a magistrate c o d  facility, which it has done and 
will continue to do. However, under I.C. 1-2218, upon order of a majority of the district 
judges, the Cities must either provide their own building or provide for use of the County 
facilities by compensating the County for their proportionate share." Twin Falls County, 143 
Idaho at 400. 
consistent with the decision in Twin Falls County is "No." The 1971 Administrative Order was 
entered. Boise City complied with that order by providing the Kootenai Street facility. The 
1971 Order was replaced with the 1980 Administrative Order. Boise City complied with the 
1980 Order by providing the Barrister facility. The Barrister facility no longer exists, thus the 
legal justification and the factual necessity for the 1980 Order no longer exists. It should have 
been vacated 
B. THE CONTINUATION OF THE 1980 ORDER, AND THE 2007 ORDER, 
REQUIRING BOISE CITY TO PROVIDE MAGISTRATE COURT FACILITIES, 
EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Constitutional questions are purely questions of law. Ada Cozrnty Zighway Dist. v. Total 
Success Investments, 145 Idaho 360, 369 (2008). The standard of review is de novo. Id. "There 
is a presumption in favor of constitutionality . . . and the burden of establishing that the statute or 
regulation is unconstitutional rests upon the challengers." American Falls Resewoiv Disr. No. 2. 
v. Idaho Department of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862,869 (2007). 
The critical question in this case is whether the 2007 Order, the 1980 Order, and tbe 
statute upon which they are based, are constitutional. The Fourth Judicial District Judges labeled 
the constitutional issues raised by Boise City "creative." However, the constitutional questions 
at issue are serious questions that deserve more than short shrift by the District Court - especially 
i 
when the issue is the court's own funding and its seemingly unque$t{onable authority to demand 
it. 
1. The Orders and the statute upon which they are based are in direct violation 
of Article VII, Section 5, of the Idaho Constitution. 
a) The Court Erred by Concluding that No Tax Is Levied on the Citizens 
of Boise City. 
The Fourth Judicial District Judges began their constitutional analysis by proclaiming: 
"No tax was levied on the citizens of Boise City." (Mem. Order, p. 13.) Before reaching a legal 
conclusion that no tax was levied, it would be prudent to first take into consideration the 
definition of a tax. A tax is "a forced contribution by the public at large to meet public needs." 
Bvewstev v. City of Pocatello, 11 5 Idaho 502, 505 (1 988). The Orders require the City of Boise 
to provide facilities, equipment, staff, personnel, and other expenses of the county-wide 
magistrate's division. This amounts to a forced contribution by the public at large to meet public 
needs. Whether the City provides for the functions of the court at Barrister or at the new Ada 
County Courthouse under an agreement is of no moment. The City's taxpayers are ordered to 
pay. The City has no other means to obtain a stream of revenue for courts other than an ad 
valorem tax. It is indeed a tax. 
b) The Court Erred by Concluding that the Tax Is Uniform and Non- 
Duplicative. 
The Fouith Judicial District Judges concluded that the taxes for courts in Ada County 
. i 
are uniform and non-duplicative. Article VII, Section 5 of the Id& Constitution provides that 
taxes shall be uniform and non-duplicative, 
All tuxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the 
territorial limits, ofthe authorily levying the tax, and shall be levied and 
collected under general laws, which shall prescribe such regulations as 
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property . . . duplicate 
taxation ofproperty for the same purpose during the same year, is hereby 
prohibited. 
(emphasis added.) 
There is no disagreement that Ada County taxes all of its residents for court functions 
in two ways. First, County taxpayers (including those in incorporated areas) pay an ad valorem 
tax to the general fund, a portion of which pays for the fiulctions of the district court (of which 
the magistratc division is a part). Second, each taxpayer also pays a special levy which 
"provid[es] for the functions of the district court and the magistrate division of the district court 
within the county." Idaho Code 5 31-867(1) (empltasis added).6 In 2007 the special levy for 
courts in Ada County was $3,016,808. (R. p. 87, Ex. 8, Houde Aff. Ex. I.) 
(1) Boise City taxpayers pay a duplicative court tax. 
In addition to a general ad valorem tax and the special levy, Boise City taxpayers pay a 
duplicate tax in order to comply with the Order. The Fourth Judicial District Judges concluded, 
erroneously, that Boise City's payment to Ada County is 'proportionate' to its usage, and 
therefore not 'duplicative'. The district judges provided no authority to support its 
'use/proportionality test.'7 (Mem. Order, p. 14.) The test for whether a tax is duplicative is not 
proportionality. Rather, the test is thepurpose of the tax. As articulated in Humbird Lumber Co. 
v. Kootenai County, 79 P. 396 (Idaho 1904), 
The prohibition . . . against duplicate taxation was yndoubtedly directed 
against the taxing of the same property twice during the same year for the 
same purpose, while other like and similar property is taxed only once 
during the same period for the same purpose. 
Id. at 398 (emphasis added). The key, then, is to first look at thepurpose of each tax. The tax 
yet  Boise City was still under the 1980 Order and was still providing the facility, equipment, 
stafi; personnel, supplies and other expenses of the Magistrate's Division. 
Moreover, the Court's own Order does not limit the City's contributions to only its 
proportionate use. The Order requires the City to pay for the magistrate division in its entirety. 
imposed by the 1980 Order - which mirrors the language of Idaho Code S; 1-2218 verbatim - 
requires Boise City to tax its residents for the purpose of providing a facility, equipment, 
personnel, etc., and other expenses for the functions of the Ada County District Court's 
magistrate division. Likewise, the puipose of the special levy is to "provid[e] for the functions 
of the district court and the magistrate division of the district court within the county" including 
all court expenditures and the salaries of deputy court clerks.' Idaho Code S; 31-867(1) 
(emphasis added). With the exception of the facility requirement, the tax imposed by the Order 
has the same purpose as the special levy's purpose - to provide a county magistrate facility. 
Unlike any other county taxpayer, Boise taxpayers pay not only the general ad valorem taxes for 
courts and the special court levy, but also a tax to comply with the 1980 Order by the Ada 
County District Court. No other taxpayers in the County pay three times for the same purpose. 
This coilstitutes a duplicative tax. 
(2) The Taxes for Ada County District Court Magistrate Division 
Are Non-uniform. 
The uniformity provision states that "[a]ll taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of 
subjects within the territorial limits, of the authority levying the tax. " The Fourth Judicial 
District Judges erred when they proclaimed that, because Boise City's taxes are uniform 
lhroughout the city, there is no uniformity problem. The analytical fjaw stems from proclaiming 
i 
Boise City as the "taxing authority" and the taxpayers of Boise as the "class of subjects." 
Relating to the authority to fund the courts, a historical perspective is helpful. Prior to the 
1970s, the Idaho courts were not consolidated. For instance, cities had municipal courts. A 
An amendment to the special levy law in 1997 added the ability for the special court fund to 
pay for all court functions (except a facility) irzcluding salaries of deputy court clerks. 1997 
Idaho Sess. Laws p. 91. 
constitutional amendment and statutory amendments changed that effective January 11, 1971. 
Boise City's authority, along with all other cities throughout the state, to provide a court for its 
taxpayers was repealed by the legislature in 1969 and effective in 1971. 1969 Idaho Sess. laws p. 
344-346. Functions of the old municipal courts were transferred to the magistrate's division of 
the district court. M~RLIN S.YOUNG ET AL., JUSTICE FOR THE TIMES: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF 
THE IDAHO STATE COURTS, 176-177 (Carl F. Bianchi, ed., Idaho Law Foundation, 1990). The 
magistrate courts' jurisdiction included the types of cases previously heard by probate, police, 
justice and municipal courts. Later in the 1970s, the magistrate courts' jurisdiction expanded to 
take on additional responsibilities of domestic relations, child support, child custody, parental 
right's termination, and habeas corpus proceedings. JUSTICE FOR THE TIMES, at 182-18. These 
responsibilities far exceed those of the former municipal courts. 
(a) The Taxing Authority is with the District Court, Not the 
City of Boise. 
The authority to force contributions from a city for court functions is found not in Title 
50 (Municipal Corporations) of the Idaho Code; rather, it is found in Title 1 (Courts and Court 
Officials). Idaho Code 3 1-2218 does not provide a city with taxing authority. Title 1 confers on 
the county district judges the authority to make the decision that a city will provide for the 
functions of the magistrate court. The district judges, by a majoGfy vote, can order a city to 
i 
provide court functions. Once that decision is made, a city has no discretion. The statute is 
mandatory (and apparently ad infiniturn). Once the district judges enter an order, the result is 
necessarily a tax. The taxing authority to initiate the magistrate court to be funded by city 
taxpayers rests with the Ada County District Court. 
The district judges discussed Independent School Dist. No. 6 v. Common School Dist. No. 
38, 64 Idaho 303 (1942), to arrive at the conclusion the tax is unifonn. ZSD No. 6 is easily 
distinguishable. It involved a school district which was statutorily authorized to enter into 
contracts with other school districts to provide schooling. Upon the "initiative and the 
agreement" of the school district's own board of trustees, School District No. 6 entered into a 
contract to provide schooling for the pupils of two other independent school districts in exchange 
for payment. Later, School District No. 6 argued, partly upon the uniformity clause, to recover 
the difference between the per capita cost and what the other districts had paid. The Court held 
thestatute and the contract were not in violation of the uniformity clause. The statute conferred 
the authority and power on the district trustees to combine with another school district for the 
purpose of education. The arrangement "imposed no additional tax, imposition or burden." Id. at 
789. 
Unlike the school district in ZSD No. 6, the city is not statutorily authorized to provide 
court facilities and functions. Rather, another entity, the district judges, is authorized to ordev 
the city to provide court facilities and functions. The school district arrangement involved the 
purpose for which school districts exist - to educate students. The district judges' Order imposes 
additional taxes and burdens upon the city taxpayers to pay for a purpose for which cities are no 
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longer authorized.. Finally, unlike the independent school district2 &ho did not share the saine 
taxpayers, the City's taxpayers live in, and already pay taxes to, the County for court purposes. 
This Court has explained: "[Ilf there is any ground for the interest of a county in the 
spending of money, it must be a county purpose to authorize the levy and the levy must be 
unifonn throughout the county." Idaho County v. Fenn Highway District, 43 Idaho 233, 378 
(1926). The case at bar is closer to Fenn, wherein Idaho County attempted to compel the Fenn 
highway district to repair part of the highway within the boundaries of the district. 'The district 
refused. The Supreme Court held that the county had no autl~ority to do so. The Court explained 
that taxes levied by a county must be unifonn. Id. at 378. If the county has authority to spend the 
money, it must be for a county purpose. Id. Simply put, providing district magistrate courts are a 
county purpose and the taxes for that purpose must be uniform within the county. 
On the other hand, should this Court determine that courts are a city purpose, the statute 
is still constitutionally infirm. The Fenn Court articulated that the uniformity requirement works 
hand-in-hand with Article VII, Section 6, of the Idaho Constitution, which prohibits the 
legislature from imposing a tax on a city for city purposes. The provision implicitly prohibits the 
legislature from doing indirectly what it cannot do directly. Id. at 378. As such, the legislature 
cannot confer upon the district judges (or the county) the "power to initiate and impose a tax 
up011 and for the purposes of the [city]." Id. 
(b) The Class of Subjects Is All County Taxpayers. 
The next question is whether the tax is uniform upon the same class of subjects. The 
class of subjects is all taxpayers within the territorial limits of the county, not just the taxpayers 
in Boise. There is only one magistrate division in each county. "[Tlhere is hereby established in 
each county of the state of Idaho a magistrate division of the distiitt court." Idaho Code $ 1- 
2201. The magistrate division has jurisdiction throughout the entire county and serves a11 
taxpayers within the county, whether in an incorporated city or in ail unincorporated area.9 
It should be noted that magistrates are retained in county-wide elections in the county for which 
the magistrate is a resident. Idaho Code $ 1-2220. 
There is no Boise City Municipal court." Nor is there a Boise City Magistrate Division of the 
Ada County District Court. The uniformity provision requires all taxes on the same class of 
subject to be uniform. This tax is not uniform 
c. The Orders and Idaho Code 5 1-2218 Violate Equal Protection. 
Interestingly, the Fourth Judicial District Judges completely failed to provide an equal 
protection analysis. For equal protection in tax cases, the rational basis test is the appropriate 
standard. Bon Appetit Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. State, 117 Idaho 1002, 1004 (1989). An act of the 
legislature is presumed to be constitutional, but whether the act is reasonable or arbitrary or 
discriminatory is a question of law for determination by this Court. Id. at 1003 
The equal protection analysis is in two steps. The first step is to determine if there is a 
conceivable public purpose. The City willingly concedes that providing county magistrate court 
fulctions and facilities is a public purpose. 
The second step is to determine whether the classification is reasonably related. 
The principle underlying the equal protection clauses of both the Idaho 
and United States Constitutions is that all persons in like circumstances 
should receive the same benefits and burdens of the law. This Court has 
held that a classification for tax purposes is reviewed on the rational basis 
test. The rational basis test requires that a statutory classification be 
rationally related to a legitimate government objective. 
Bon Appetit Gourmet Foods, 117 Idaho at 1004 (citations omitted). ' 
1 ;, 
The City disputes the classification both in the statute and as applied in the orders. The 
purpose of the statute is to provide magistrate court facilities and Iunctions; yet the 
classification authorizes a court to order only city residents to provide for the county magistrate 
lo  Indeed, oi~ly the Legislature has the authority to provide for the establishment of a trial court 
within a City. Idaho Const. art. V, § 14. This authority is non-delegable. 
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court. Ultimately, this results in classification between taxpayers within an incorporated area 
which is under a 5 1-2218 order and all other taxpayers within the county. It is not rational to 
classify one city's taxpayers as the providers of a county-wide magistrate court. 
To make matters worse, the statute provides no standard upon which the district judges 
should order one city to provide it and not another. In the 2007 Order, the Fourth Judicial 
District Judges' after-the-fact justification is that "Boise City accounts for the greatest percentage 
and the greatest number of misdemeanor and inkaction filings in Ada County." (Mem. Order at 
I 
12.) To be clear, Boise City accounts for about 51% of misdemeanors and infractions. Wem. 
Order at 8.) To state the obvious, this means the rest of the cities, the county, etc., account for 
49% of the misdemeanors and infractions filed in the Ada County magistrate court. 
Idaho Code § 1-2218 articulates no such 'proportionality' standard. The statute 
empowers district judges to order any city of any size, with no mention of proportionality, to 
provide magistrate court quarters, etc., for the entire county. For all other county purposes, taxes 
are borne by all coul~ty residents. Location of a taxpayer's property within a city is not a 
legitimate tax classification for imposition of a tax to support a county-wide magistrate court. 
No special benefit accrues to a taxable parcel within an "ordered" city as opposed to taxable 
parcels outside an "ordered" city. See Richmond Courzty v. Richmond County Business Assoc., 
3 i 
228 Ga. 281 (197.1) (holding an ordinance in violation of equal prbhction where the ordinance 
assessed fees on businesses within a county, but outside of municipality where the revenue from 
fees supported services for a11 county residents including those in municipalities and the burden 
of the tax was "classified geographically" with no reasonable basis.) 
County residents who reside witlzin the City of Boise are being treated differently than 
county residents who reside outside the City of Boise. Boise City taxpayers are shouldering 
more of the burden. The classification is clearly arbitrary and not reasonably related to the 
purpose. The statute violates the equal protection clauses of the U.S. and Idaho constitutions. 
Even if this Court finds the classification is not unreasonable, the statute and orders are 
being applied by the district judges in violation of equal protection. Other cities similarly situated 
are not treated the same. 
As explained in 1994, the Fourth District Judges ordered Garden City and Meridian to 
provide suitable and adequate quarters for the magistrate's division, as well as staff, personnel, 
equipment, etc. (Reiner Second Aff., Ex. A, Aug. 12, 1994, Order.) They did not comply. 
In March of 1995, the Trial Courl Administrator ("TCA") wrote to the City Attorneys for 
Garden City and Meridian to inform them the Order was still in effect. 
On February 27, 1995, the District Judges of the Fourth Judicial District 
met and confirmed that their previous Order issued August 12, 1994 
requiring your client cities to provide suitable quarters, etc., for the 
magistrate division is still in effect and expected to be complied with, and 
directed that 1 contact each of you regarding this matter. 
(Allen Aff., Ex. 0, March 8, 1995, Letter from TCA to Attorneys of Garden City and Meridian.) 
The TCA agreed to honor an Administrative Judge's determination to extend the Order until 
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October 1, 1995. Again, Garden City and Meridian did not compll.. The TCA recalls that he 
"determined not to further pursue this matter with Garden City and the City of Meridian." (R. p. 
88, R. Ex. 25, Traylor Aff., para. 13.) The Garden Citymeridian administrative order has not 
been enforced by the district judges. only the administrative Order against the City of Boise has 
ever been enforced by the district judges. 
The district judges fail to articulate a reasonable justification for the disparate treatment. 
They merely state the Garden City and Meridian order "ivas not implemented, although there was 
no formal order vacating or rescinding the Order." (Mem. Decision at 6) (emphasis added). 
While the equal protection clause does not require that all persons be treated identically, 
distinctions in treatment between those similarly situated must rest on "some ground of 
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." Stanton v. 
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975). Merely not being "implemented" is not a ground of difference. 
As applied, the disparate treatment of the administrative orders in question singles out the City 
and taxpayers of Boise, who are similarly situated to those in Garden City and Meridian, for no 
rational reason. The orders as applied fail an equal protection analysis. 
C. THE DISTRICT JUDGES' DECISION TO ALLOW ADA COUNTY TO 
INTERVENE IN THE CITY'S PETITION TO SET ASIDE ADMINISTRATIVE 
ORDER WAS ERROR. 
Before the County was ever a party to this petition, the Ada County District 
Adnlinistrative Judge requested that the City serve Ada County with the City's Petition to Set 
Aside the 1980 Order. The judge's clerk called the City and requested service on Ada County. 
The City coinplied as directed. (Colaianni Letter to Hon. Darla Williamson, dated 912012007 
attached hereto as Attachment 1.) Before the County was a party and before it had even inoved 
j 
to intervene, the Ada County Court provided the County with notidecof a hearing in this matter. 
(R. p. 16 - 17.) Shortly thereafter, the County moved to intervene. The motion was granted. 
1. Standard of Review. 
The standard of review for granting a motion to intervene in an administrative order of 
district judges appears to be an issue of first impression in Idaho. Article V, 3 9 provides the 
Supreme Court jurisdiction to review "any decision of the district courts, or judges thereof," No 
standard of review is established in this section of Idaho's Constitution. Further, Idaho Code 
provides no clear standard of review when an appeal is taken from a decision of the district 
judges of the Fourth Judicial District pursuant to Idaho Code 5 1-2218. Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure l(a) applies in all "actions, proceedings and appeals of a civil nature." The Petition 
filed by the City of Boise concerns an administrative order directing the City to provide 
magiskate facilities. The 1980 Order was not the result of a civil action, proceeding or appeal. 
In absence of a clear legal standard of review, it is for this Court to determine how and 
whether the district judges fulfilled their obligation under the law. "The specific standards 
governing review.. .depend upon the nature of the power exercised in making the decision." City 
of Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906, 693 P.2d 1108 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing 
Coopev v. Board of County Commissioizers ofAda County, 101 Idaho 407,614 P.2d 947 (1980)). 
2. Idaho requires an "action" be filed before an intervention may be permitted. 
The earliest Idaho case cited for the proposition that the right to intervene requires an 
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underlying action was decided in 1869 by the Supreme Court of thk ferritory of Idaho. Glidden 
v. Green, 1 Idaho 235 (1 869). Green explains that "[tlhe right to intervene has been taken from 
the code of Louisiana, and adopted into our practice." Id. And the "statute uses the word 'action' 
in speaking of the right to intervene." Id. Specifically, the territorial judiciary adopted this code 
as follows: 
Section 601, p. 204, Laws of Idaho, first session, says: 'Any person shall be 
entitled to intervene in an action who has an interest in the matter in 
litigation ...An intervention talces place when a third person is permitted to 
become apavty to an action between other persons. . . .' 
Id. (emphasis added.) 
Some 22 years after the Territorial Supreme Court made its ruling in Green and about a 
year afier statehood, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled "[a]n action cannot be pending until it has 
been commenced. Civil actions in the courts are commenced by filing a complaint." Gold Huntev 
Mining & Smelting Co. v. Holleman, 2 Idaho 839, 27 P. 4113 (1891). where there is no 
underlying case there can be no intervention. 
As with case law, an historical survey of state and federal intervention statutes from 
statehood to the present shows no substantial changes in the law: absent an underlying action 
there can be no intervention, whether mandatory or permissive. Accordingly, and as a matter of 
long-standing and well-settled case and statutory law, the County's Motion to Intervene should 
have been denied. 
3. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 24 also requires an "action." 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a) and 24(b) begin with identical language: "Upon 
timely application anyone shall be pennitted to intervene in an action." (emphasis added). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a) states "A civil action is 'cgmmenced by the filing of a 
'! 4 
complaint with the court . . .," (emphasis added). 
The City has filed no complaint upon which the County should have been pennitted to 
intervene. There was simply no actiorz (i.e., complaint or lawsuit) filed by the City against any 
person or entity upon which intervention could attach. The City merely filed a petition to the 
district judges requesting them to set aside, quash, or vacate a purely administrative order the 
26 
district judges issued 28 years ago directing the City to provide courtroom facilities for the 
Magistrate's Division. There is no evidence to suggest the County was permitted to intervene 28 
years ago. 
4. The County's attempt to impose itself into a purely administrative function 
of the district judges was an impermissible interference with the 
administrative duties of the judiciary. 
The 28-year old Order the City petitioned the court to set aside was issued by the 
majority of the district judges pursuant to the statutory authority found at Idaho Code 5 1-2218 
dealing with facilities and equipment provided by the city. 
Any city in the state shall, upon order of a majority of the district judges in 
the judicial district, provide suitable and adequate quarters for a 
magistrate's division of the district court, including the facilities and 
equipment necessary to make the space provided functional for its 
intended use, and shall provide for the staff personnel, supplies, and other 
expenses of the magistrate's division. 
The power to issue orders and make changes to them is found at Idaho Code 5 1-1603(8) 
which permits the court to "amend and control its process and orders, so as to make them 
confonnable to law and justice." The Order only involves Boise City and the district judges of 
the Fourth Judicial District, not Ada County. The statutory authority for the Order is Idaho Code 
5 1-2218 which only involves the relatioilship between a city and a majority of the district judges 
in the judicial district. Twin Falls County, 143 Idaho at 400. ~ d a g o u n t y  had no authority to 
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address or interfere in the decision making process contemplated by Idaho Code 5 1-2218. 
D. THE DISTRICT JUDGES OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IMPOSED 
AN ERRONEOUS STANDARD OF PROOF UPON THE CITY. 
The court in its Memorandum Decision and Order established a standard of proof as set 
forth in Noble v. Fishev, 126 Idaho 885, 888, 894 P.2d 118 (1995), which was to demonstrate 
"good and sufficient cause" to set aside the Order. Noble involved a divorce proceeding. The 
Petition filed by the City is an administrative matter. It is clear in divorce proceedings that Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and Idaho Code $ 32-709 apply. It is also clear in civil litigation 
that Rule 60(b) governs. There is no authority for the proposition that Rule 60(b) applies in a 
purely administrative matter. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l(a) does not provide authority for 
the proposition that the rules apply to administrative hearings. The court erred in erroileously 
and arbitrarily imposing such a burden of proof on the City 
The District Judges' imposition of a burden of proof is in error. The City of Boise was 
provided no notice that it had a burden of proof, let alone the significant burden of demonstrating 
good and sufficient cause. This amounts to a violation of the City's due process rights. Because 
the subject of the City's Petition was an administrative order &on1 the District Judges of the 
Fourth Judicial District, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply. No court rule or 
statutes other than Idaho Code $5 1-2217 and 1-2218 establish a burden of proof upon the City. 
Further, there is no indication in either statute that a City has ally burden other than coming 
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forward to the Court and requesting re-examination of the necessity of the Order. 
E. THE DISTRlCT JUDGES HAD AN OBLIGATION TO ANALYZE THE 
ELEMENTS IDENTIFIED IN THE STATUTE AND CONSIDER CHANGED 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Idaho Code 5 1-2217 malces it very clear that in Idaho, counties have the obligation to 
provide suitable and adequate quarters for the magistrate's division of the district court. Only 
upon action of the majority of the district judges pursuant to Idaho Code $ 1-2218 does a city 
receive that obligation. Comn~on sense would dictate, in absence of statutory guidance to the 
contrary, that the court, when faced with such a decision would look to the words of the statute 
for guidance regarding the issues to be considered. Here, Idaho Code $4 1-2217 and 1-2218 
refers to "suitable and adequate" facilities. Upon a request for relief from an Idaho Code $ 1- 
2218 Order, it is incumbent upon the district judges, as the administrative apparatus of the court 
system, to analyze the adequacy of the existing facility. The judges must be convinced that the 
existing facility is inadequate and that a city should be made to expend taxpayer funds to provide 
an additional magistrate court facility. In this case, the judges neglected this duty. 
The City argued the judges should consider a number of issues constituting changed 
circumstances and warranted reconsideration of the 28-year old Order. The most significant 
reason the circumstances Rave changed is the construction and operation of a new consolidated 
courthouse in Ada County. A courthouse that was intended to house all of the magistrate judges 
in Ada County, with the exception of those housed at the juvenile detention facility. When the 
new courthouse opened in 2002, all magistrate matters previously held at the Barrister facility 
were moved to that facility. The court, in its Memorandum Decision and Order, found that the 
City allowed, "the Barrister courthouse functions to be transferred to the new Ada County 
' 
Courthouse." (Mem. Order, p. 1 I ,  Ls. 18-19) No evidence was &vkr provided to demonstrate 
that the City had any authority to determine where the magistrate judges of the Fourth Judicial 
District were chambered. This decision was solely that of the Trial Court Administrator and the 
Adininistrative Judge. The City of Boise had and has no authority to tell the judicial branch of 
government how to operate. 
The court determined that the City of Bo~se opted to pay some costs to Ada County and is 
somehow now foreclosed forever from requesting the court reconsider the 1980 Order based 
upon changed circumstances. The court cites no authority for the propositioil that the City has 
missed its opportunity to request the reconsideration of this 28-year old Order. By its very 
nature, an administrative order may hecoine obsolete, antiquated or unnecessary based upon 
population growth or recession, technology and other intervening administrative decisions. The 
court simply must be willing to review the necessity of administrative orders, particularly 28- 
year old orders. 
The court concludes that the City entered into an agreement with the County in 1999 and 
that this agreement serves to satisfy the City's obligation under the 1980 Order. Further, the 
court finds that, "[tlhe decision by Boise City to fulfill its obligation to provide suitable 
magistrate's facilities by contracting with Ada County is not an appropriate basis to set aside the 
October 9, 1980 Order." (Mem. Order, p. 12, Ls. 9-11) The court misses the point with this 
analysis. While the City concedes it entered into an agreement in 1999, the reality is that since 
that time, circumstances have changed significantly and the interpretation of the law has 
changed. All of the taxpayers of Ada County have paid for a new consolidated court facility 
which currently houses all of the magistrate duties of the County, except for juvenile. It is 
. i 
absolutely appropriate and prudent to request the District Court Judg'es revisit the 1980 Order as 
the circumstances that: caused the Order to come into existence are drastically different than 
those now existing. 
The court points out that the City has a substantial portion of the magistrate court 
caseload. Based upon this fact alone, the cout finds it unpalatable to set aside the Order. No 
authority was provided for the court's finding that the City's caseload warrants continuation of a 
28-year old Order to provide facilities. Noticeably absent in the court's analysis is any mention 
of the adequacy of the new Ada County Courthouse to process the current caseload. The court 
made not one finding that there were not enough magistrate courtrooms, or that the buildirtg is 
somehow unable to accommodate thepersonnel necessary to process the current caseload. There 
is nothingin Idaho Code 5 1-2218 to authorize the court to arbitrarily consider caseload alone 
and neglect the suitability and adequacy of the current courthouse. 
In its Decision and Order, the court ultimately co~lcludes that, "Boise City has failed to 
meet its burden in demonstrating that there is sufficient and good cause to set aside the October 
9, 1980 Order. Accordingly, the Petition of Boise City is denied." (Mem. Order, p. 16, Ls. 3-5) 
The court failed in its responsibility to administer the court system in Ada County. No inquiry or 
analysis was conducted regarding the significant change in circumstances since October 9, 1980. 
No consideration was made regarding the size and condition of the existing Ada County 
Courthouse. No discussions of the fact that the current facility was built to accommodate all of 
the magistrate judges for the County, except juveilile magistrates, was had. 
The court appeared pre-disposed at the outset to make this process somekng not 
contemplated by Title 1, Idaho Code. Instead of treating the City's Petition as an administrative 
' 
matter between the court and the City, the subject of the Order, thd court made the process to 
look more like civil litigation. Instead of engaging in a meaningful and comprehensive analysis 
of the suitability and adequacy of the existing courthouse, the court focused upon caseloads and a 
10-year old agreement between the City and County that was not the subject of this matter. 
lnstead of considering the numerous changed circumstances of the 28 years since the Order was 
put into place, the court focused on some notion of equity not contemplated by Idaho Code 5 1- 
2218. Instead of focusing on whether or not the Order was necessary for the proper 
administration of justice in Ada County, the court was co-opted by the County's assertion that 
this is a zero sum game. This is not a matter of us versus them, as both the City and the County 
represent the taxpayers. The reality is that County taxpayers are mostly City taxpayers as well, 
and all deserve the court's serious consideration of the City's Petition so not as to unnecessarily 
expend taxpayer dollars. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments and analysis set forth above, the City of Boise respectfully 
requests this Court find Idaho Code 1-2218 unconstitutional, further find that Ada County was 
not entitled to intervention, and set aside the 1980 Administrative Order. 
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September 20,2007 
Hon. Darla Williamson 
Administrative District Judge 
Fourth Judicial District - Ada County 
200 W. Front St. Rm. #5149 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile: 287-7529 
Re: In Re: Facilities and Equipment Provided by the City of Boise 
Case No. CV OT 2007- 16638 
Dear Judge Willliamson: 
Please be advised that I received a phone message from your clerk today about the 
above-captioned matter, requesting that we serve Ada County with the City's 
Petition filed herein on September 14,2007. 
We did not serve the County for several reasons. First, the Order at issue was 
directed exclusively at the City of Boise by the Fourth District Judges, sitting at 
that time. The court and cause of the Order states: "In Re: Facilities and 
Equipment Provided By The City of Boise" and it refers solely to Idaho Code $ 1- 
221 8 and the City of Boise's obligation at that time. The County was not a party 
to that Order, nor does my copy indicate the County was served. 
Second, the statute at issue leads us to the conclusion that this matter is, in law, 
exclusively a matter between the majority of District Judges and the City of Boise 
in relation to magistrate court facilities: 
Any city in the state shall, upon order of a maiority of the 
district judges in the judicial district, provid& suitable and 
adequate quarters for a magistrate's division of the district 
court, including the facilities and equipment necessary to 
make the space provided functional for its intended use, 
and shall provide for the staff personnel, supplies, and other 
expenses of the magistrate's division. (emphasis added). 
Idaho Code 5 1-221 8. 
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Of course, it is the City's position in its Petition that, in accordance with the Idaho Supreme 
Court's holding in Twin Falls County v. Cities of Twin Fulls and Filer, 146 P.3d 664 (2006), 
that the County has the statutory obligation under Idaho Code $ 1-2218 to provide the court 
facilities along with associated operational costs. The outstanding Order at issue in this 
matter is now moot as Ada County has provided the consolidated court facility and now 
owns the building that formerly housed the magistrate court facility built as a result of the 
Order. 
Finally, although Twin Falls County was a party in Twin Fulls County v. Cities of Twin Falls 
and Filer, it was so because the Fifth Judicial District Court's order in that case specifically 
directed the cities to reimburse Twin Falls County. That is not the case with the Order at 
hand. 
We do realize that the City had a contract with the County that is related, hut we believe that 
to be a separate matter. As a courtesy, however, we have now sent a copy of the City's 
petition to the County's attorney. 
Finally, we enclose a proposed order for the Fourth District Judges in relation to the City's 
Petition. If the Corn has m h e r  direction, please do not hesitate to advise my office. 
CBCldga 
Enc. 
c. Ted Argyle 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
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TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
/ ORDER 
IN RE: FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 
PROVIDED BY THE CITY OF BOISE 
Pursuant to Twin Falls County v. Cities of Twin Falls and Filer, 143 Idaho 398, 145 P.3d 
664 (2006), the Order dated October 9, 1980, is hereby satisfied, mooted, and otherwise set 
aside. 
DATED this day of ,2007. 
Case No. CV OT 2007-1 6638 
Honorable Darla J. Williamson 
Administrative District Judge 
Honorable Michael McLaughlin 
District Judge 
Honorable Kathryn Sticklen 
District Judge 
Honorable Cheri Copsey 
District Judge 
Honorable Patrick Owen 
District Judge 
Honorable Deborah Bail 
District Judge 
Honorable Ronald Wilper 
District Judge 
Honorable Mike Wetherell 
District Judge 
Honorable Thomas Neville 
District Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have on this day of September, 2007, served the 
foregoing Order as follows: 
Cary B. Colaianni 
City Attorney 
City of Boise 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, ID 83701-0500 
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J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of District Court 
By: 
Deputy Clerk 
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City Attorney 
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Additional Comments: 
Please see attached Letter and proposed Order. 
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